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Constitutionalism 
Jethro K. Lieberman 
Constitutionalism is a central and protean 
political concept that for more than two mil-
lennia has never surrendered to a formal, fixed 
definition. In its earliest incarnation, constitu-
tionalism was taken merely as descriptive fact. 
To the ancient Greeks, the constitution meant 
"the state as it actually is" (Mcilwain 1966: 26). 
Today the idea of constitutionalism comprises 
a cluster of particular jurisprudential and 
sociological attributes, summed up as "limited 
government under a higher law" (Fellman 
1973: 485). Manifestly, not every state claiming 
independent sovereignty can lay claim to the 
constitutional mantle. 
Beginning in the Roman Republic, and wan-
dering in and out of political and legal con-
sciousness for a millennium and a half, the 
concept mutated: it came to be held that there 
was law antecedent to the state, that it came 
from the people, or custom, or God, or the 
natural order, and that even private citizens, as 
members of the public, may seek relief from 
the government's abuse of the citizenry's public 
rights. The idea was fitful and equivocal. Some 
kings acknowledged they were subject to the 
law; others, at different times and in different 
places, clung to a divine right to command at 
will. In England, from the twelfth century, the 
judges held that the king was obligated to 
follow the law, meaning, for example, that he 
could not imprison someone who had not been 
tried in court. By the sixteenth century, "a 
man's home is his castle" that not even the king 
could invade was an adage that expressed the 
deeply entrenched notion of rights superior to 
the arbitrary will of the ruler. Through Magna 
Carta (1215), the Habeas Corpus Act (1614), 
the Bill of Rights (1689), the Act of Settlement 
(1701), and other parliamentary enactments, a 
British constitution was gradually assembled. 
Modern constitutionalism in practice 
emerged with the American Revolution. For 
the drafters and ratifiers of the world's oldest 
continuing written constitution, a constitution 
was, as Thomas Paine put it, "the act of the ... 
people constituting a government;' and, he 
might have added, with terms and conditions 
attached (Paine 1991: 82). As Walton H. 
Hamilton wryly observed: "Constitutionalism 
is the name given to the trust which men 
repose in the power of words engrossed on 
parchment to keep a government in order" 
(1937: 255). Constitutionalism is not just 
any government and not just any order. 
Constitutionalism rejects arbitrary govern-
ment; it recognizes and respects people's rights 
despite the contrary will of officials or even 
popular majorities. 
Different commentators have made these 
points in different ways: "Constitutionalism 
has one essential quality; it is a legal limitation 
on government" (Mcilwain 1966: 21). Consti-
tutionalism is "a determinate, stable legal 
order which prevents the arbitrary exercise of 
political power and subjects both the governed 
and the governors to 'one law for all' [people]" 
(Dunner 1964: 120). A "constitution is nece-
ssary in order to limit government and . . . if 
there is to be government by consent" (Scruton 
1984: 94). And, from the time ofMontesquieu, 
constitutionalism absorbed the maxim, in 
James Madison's words, that the "accumulation 
of all powers . . . in the same hands . . . may 
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyr-
anny" (Madison 1961: 301). 
Modern constitutionalism, then, seems to 
consist of these ingredients: (1) a fixed and 
public constitution, (2) ratified by the people, 
(3) equally applicable to all, that restrains arbi-
trary decrees by (4) separating government 
powers and (5) mandating impartial and fair 
procedures, and ( 6) that permits the people 
through regular elections to select their leaders, 
all in order (7) to preserve space in which at 
least some degree of individual autonomy may 
flourish. 
Promulgation of a constitution does not 
guarantee constitutionalism. Sham constitu-
tions, like the Soviet Union's, or illiberal con-
stitutions, like Iran's, often prescribe restraints 
on government (for example, guarantees of 
freedom of speech, press, and assembly). But 
these are cosmetic dressing on an authori-
tarian skin, ignored when their exercise would 
"harm" the interests of the state or society or 
counter the interests of an entrenched ruling 
class. Nor do such constitutions provide peo-
ple procedures to enforce their rights. In the 
Soviet Union, as in other nations that pretend 
to constitutionalism, the basic charter did not 
restrain the government; rather, the unelected 
Communist Party, which alone dictated the 
interests of state and society, emasculated 
the constitution. Likewise, in many illiberal 
states, as for example in theocratic Iran, the 
constitution may expressly restrain the 
government, but in favor not of individual 
rights-holders but of a clerical class who rule 
on theological principles that lie outside con-
stitutional norms and procedures. 
Despite the general agreement on the 
essential norms and practices of constitution-
alism, there is no definitive model and some 
basic questions remain unsettled. Students of 
the subject point to a host of constitutional 
variables, no single one of which appears to 
be crucial to determining whether a people 
enjoy constitutionalism: must the constitution 
be written or unwritten, detailed or general, 
long or short, judicially enforceable or not, 
republican or monarchical, parliamentary or 
presidential, federal or unitary? So, for example, 
though constitutionalism is often said to 
require a written constitution, some practices 
are observed as constitutional norms despite 
the lack of text. Until Franklin D. Roosevelt 
violated it in 1940, an unwritten tradition 
dating back to Washington in 1796 kept US 
presidents from serving more than two terms; 
Roosevelt's disregard of it led to the 22nd 
Amendment, mandating the limit. 
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A central problem for constitutionalism is 
the enforcement of constitutional norms. In 
the USA, there is no effective dissent from the 
practice, established in 1803 by Chief Justice 
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, that courts in 
appropriate cases may overturn statutes as 
unconstitutional. But the idea of a constitu-
tional court, though gaining ground around 
the world, is not a necessary component of 
constitutionalism. Legislatures and executives 
may feel bound by constitutional norms, even 
though they have the formal power to disre-
gard them. Not since 1707 have British mon-
archs vetoed legislation enacted by parliament, 
though they have the "legal" authority to do so. 
In the USA, decisions to impeach and convict 
federal officials, such as the president and 
judges, are wholly in the hands of Congress 
under the constitution itself, but the impeach-
ment power has been used only sparingly and 
when, occasionally, it was misused, the Senate 
refused to convict. That said, it is also indisput-
able that constitutional norms can change so 
that what was once thought to be perfectly 
plain and acceptable to one generation becomes 
unthinkable, as a matter of constitutional 
law, to another. The most spectacular example 
in American history is the Supreme Court's 
change of mind on the question of racial segre-
gation from its 1896 decision in Plessy v. 
Ferguson to its decision in 1954 in Brown v. 
Board of Education. 
While far from universal - there remain 
many repressive governments with only far-
cical claims to constitutionalism - the idea of 
constitutionalism has spread throughout the 
world during the second half of the twentieth 
century and is continuing still. Human rights 
principles adopted at Nuremberg during the 
trial of Nazi war criminals, in the International 
Declaration of Human Rights, and in many 
other international treaties and instruments, 
and the establishment of such bodies as the 
International Criminal Court in The Hague, 
all point to an emerging consensus on the 
value and necessity of constitutional regimes 
that promote individual and human rights. 
Whether countries that have survived political 
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revolutions and the many new nations that 
wrested sovereignty from their colonial gover-
nors can construct a constitutional order 
depends more on their ability to develop and 
sustain adequate political cultures than on 
the promises and claims made in their new 
constitutions. Unless they commit to demo-
cratic principles and shun one-party and 
theological rule, no country can depend on 
bold or noble pronouncements in a paper 
charter to establish an enduring constitution-
alism for its people. 
SEE ALSO: Constitutional Democracy; 
Constitutional Law, United States; Human Rights; 
Liberal Democracy; Rule of Law; Separation of 
Powers 
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Constructivism 
Adam Cureton 
The term "constructivism" names a family of 
political, moral and metaethical views that, in 
general terms, regard some or all normative 
claims as valid in virtue ofbeing outcomes of a 
"procedure of construction" in which actual or 
hypothetical agents react to, choose, or other-
wise settle on principles of justice, moral rules, 
values, etc. Traditionally, moral validity or jus-
tifiability was thought to depend on God, the 
Forms, or some other independent moral 
order. Various procedures of a different, episte-
mological, sort were then proposed to help us 
gain access to the moral facts, which were 
thought to exist independently of us (e.g., we 
might need to undergo physical and mental 
training of the sort described in Plato's Republic 
or learn how to reflect in a "calm, cool hour"). 
Constructivists, by contrast, think that there 
are certain procedures that are not designed to 
discover which normative claims are already 
valid. For them, the validity of some or all rea-
sons, principles, values or other normative 
claims consist in being the result of a procedure 
of construction. For example, Rousseau (1997) 
held that states are legitimate just in case and 
because they would be agreed to by reasonable 
people who were concerned to advance their 
